User:王桁霽/沙盒丙

死亡人数

聖克魯斯大屠殺三十年忌時的悼念活動

佔領統治時期的死亡人數難以確計。2005年，东帝汶接纳、真相与和解委员会得出「基於科學的主要結論」，認為在最保守的情形下，雙方衝突造成的死亡人數达102,800（±12,000）。其中，18,600 （±1,000）人被杀害或失踪，另外84,000（±11,000）人死于饥荒或疾病，這些數字已遠高於和平时期的正常死亡人数。委員會還稱「因由衝突導致的疾病和飢餓而死的人」恐有180,000之多。由於該統計以 2004 年時在世的倖存者記敘為主要依據，因此在「家眷已全數罹難」且「墓碑不存」等情況下，死者則無法被統計在內。此外，委员会认为印尼军方应为约 70% 的暴力杀戮负责。

耶魯大學種族滅絕學者本·基尔南稱，儘管統計上有二十萬或以上的數據，但「实际死亡人数应近于十五萬人。」 根據天主教會的統計，東帝汶人口數從1974年的688,711減為1982年時的425,000，意味著東帝汶在印尼入侵與佔領下有二十餘萬人死亡，「二十萬死難」的統計此後在世界範圍內被廣泛援引。諸如大赦国际和人权观察等信源亦支持此数据。

法國專家加布里埃爾·德菲（Gabriel Defert）通過分析葡萄牙、印度尼西亞的可用官方數據，結合天主教會資料，認為1975年12月至1981年12月間，约有308,000名帝汶人死亡，約佔侵略前總人口的44%。曾供職於爪哇沙拉笛加大学的喬治·阿迪瓊德羅教授在研究印尼軍方數據後總結稱，在佔領的頭幾年，事實上有300,000帝汶人被殺害。

澳洲國立大學教授羅伯特·科里布（Robert Cribb）通過質疑各次人口普查的準確性，繼而認為「二十萬死」的說法被嚴重誇大。 Robert Cribb of the Australian National University argues that the toll was significantly exaggerated. He argues that the 1980 census that counted 555,350 Timorese, although "the most reliable source of all," was probably a minimum rather than a maximum estimate for the total population. "It is worth recalling that hundreds of thousands of East Timorese disappeared during the violence of September 1999, only to reappear later," he writes.

The 1980 census becomes more improbable in the face of the 1987 census that counted 657,411 Timorese – this would require a growth rate of 2.5% per year, nearly identical to the very high growth rate in East Timor from 1970 to 1975, and a highly unlikely one given the conditions of the brutal occupation, including Indonesian efforts to discourage reproduction. Noting the relative lack of personal accounts of atrocities or of traumatised Indonesian soldiers, he further adds that East Timor "does not appear—on the basis of news reports and academic accounts—to be a society traumatized by mass death...the circumstance leading up to the Dili massacre of 1991...indicate a society which retained its vigour and indignation in a way which would probably not have been possible if it had been treated as Cambodia was treated under Pol Pot." Even Indonesian military strategy was based on winning the "hearts and minds" of the population, a fact that does not support charges of mass killing.

Kiernan, starting from a base population of 700,000 Timorese in 1975 (based on the 1974 Catholic Church census), calculated an expected 1980 population of 735,000 Timorese (assuming a growth rate of only 1% per year as a result of the occupation). Accepting the 1980 count that Cribb regards as at least 10% (55,000) too low, Kiernan concluded that as many as 180,000 might have died in the war. Cribb argued that the 3% growth rate suggested by the 1974 census was too high, citing the fact that the church had previously postulated a growth rate of 1.8%, which would have produced a figure in line with the Portuguese population estimate of 635,000 for 1974.

Although Cribb maintained that the Portuguese census was almost certainly an underestimate, he believed it to be more likely correct than the church census, since any church attempt to extrapolate the size of the total population "must be seen in light of its incomplete access to society" (less than half of Timorese were Catholic). Assuming a growth rate in line with the other nations of South East Asia, then, would yield a more accurate figure of 680,000 for 1975, and an expected 1980 population of slightly over 775,000 (without accounting for the decline in the birth rate resulting from the Indonesian occupation). The deficit remaining would be almost exactly 200,000. According to Cribb, Indonesian policies restricted the birth rate by up to 50% or more. Thus, around 45,000 of these were not born rather than killed; another 55,000 were "missing" as a result of the Timorese evading the Indonesian authorities who conducted the 1980 census. A variety of factors—the exodus of tens of thousands from their homes to escape FRETILIN in 1974–5; the deaths of thousands in the civil war; the deaths of combatants during the occupation; killings by FRETILIN; and natural disasters—diminish further still the civilian toll attributable to Indonesian forces during this time. Considering all this data, Cribb argues for a much lower toll of 100,000 or less, with an absolute minimum of 60,000, and a mere tenth of the civilian population dying unnaturally, for the years 1975–80.

Kiernan responded, however, by asserting that the influx of migrant workers during the occupation and the increase in the population growth rate typical of a mortality crisis justifies accepting the 1980 census as valid despite the 1987 estimate and that the 1974 church census—though a "possible maximum"—cannot be discounted because the church's lack of access to society might well have resulted in an undercount. He concluded that at least 116,000 combatants and civilians were killed by all sides or died "unnatural" deaths from 1975 to 1980 (if true, this would yield the result that about 15% of the civilian population of East Timor was killed from 1975 to 1980). F. Hiorth separately estimated that 13% (95,000 out of an expected 730,000 when accounting for the reduction in birth rates) of the civilian population died during this period. Kiernan believes that the deficit was most probably around 145,000 when accounting for the reduction in birth rates, or 20% of East Timor's population. The mid-value of the UN report is 146,000 deaths; R.J. Rummel, an analyst of political killings, estimates 150,000.

Many observers have called the Indonesian military action in East Timor an example of genocide. Oxford held an academic consensus calling the event genocide and Yale university teaches it as part of their "Genocide Studies" program. In a study of the word's legal meaning and applicability to the occupation of East Timor, legal scholar Ben Saul concludes that because no group recognized under international law was targeted by the Indonesian authorities, a charge of genocide cannot be applied. However, he also notes: "The conflict in East Timor most accurately qualifies as genocide against a ‘political group’, or alternatively as ‘cultural genocide’, yet neither of these concepts is explicitly recognised in international law." The occupation has been compared to the killings of the Khmer Rouge, the Yugoslav wars, and the Rwandan genocide.

印度尼西亞方面的傷亡情況則記載完備。印尼士兵與親印尼民兵在入侵行動時陣亡的，以及佔領時因病而死、意外身故的，共有2,300人。雅加达东部芝浪卡的军事总部內今豎有一座「蓮之紀念碑（Monumen Seroja）」，紀念印度尼西亞蓮之行動與對東帝汶的佔領統治，其底部鐫刻有這些死者的姓名。

Accurate numbers of Indonesian casualties are well-documented. The complete names of around 2,300 Indonesian soldiers and pro-Indonesian militias who died in action as well as from illness and accidents during the entire occupation are engraved into the Seroja Monument located in Armed Forces Headquarters in Cilangkap, East Jakarta.